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Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000100010006-7

TAB "A"

ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File

Comments on CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 341 (revision of IM-288),
14 November 1950. Subject: "Political Alignments and Major Psychological
Warfare Vulnerabilities in the Event of War before July 1951."

1. G-2 assumes that the object of the Interdepartmental Information Staff in requesting this estimate was to prepare plans for waging psychological warfare on behalf of the West (a) before the outbreak of war, in those countries which are wavering in their potential alignment and in those countries which it is believed will be enemy or under enemy control, and (b) after the outbreak of war, in those countries which will be enemy or under enemy control. If this assumption is correct, G-2 believes that the latter part, viz, the psychological vulnerability of certain countries after their invasion and occupation by the Soviets has not been adequately covered. This inadequacy, which should be remedied, is applicable to practically all the countries of Western Europe and the Near and Middle East which would be invaded by the Soviets.

2. Page 1, paragraph 2, line 3. The objectives of Soviet military occupation should be re-stated. The Soviets would not occupy all the Near East - Egypt and to the west, for example. On the other hand they would occupy portions of the Middle East, which is not mentioned at all. The Far East is not mentioned here at all, although it is touched on in the corresponding paragraph in the Summary. Recommend that the first sentence end as follows: ". . . continental Western Europe (probably less Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and such areas of the Near, Middle and Far East as the Soviets consider necessary to their grand strategy." Paragraph 2 of the Summary should be made to conform to the foregoing recommended change.

3. Page 4, paragraph 7, line 4: Recommend placement of a comma after "forces" and the insertion of "with the probable exception of Bulgaria, . . ."

4. Page 4, paragraph 7, lines 15 - 16: Recommend deletion of ". . . Poland, where a large security force . . ." and substitution therefor of ". . . Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States where large security forces . . ."

5. Page 5, paragraph 9, second sentence: This statement is no longer applicable to the situation in Korea. Something that reflects the current situation should be substituted.

6. Pages 5 - 6, paragraph 10: Recommend that this paragraph be revised so as to take into consideration the possibility of the continued existence of the Nationalist regime on Formosa.

7. Page 7, paragraph 11, line 9: Recommend changing "probable" to "possible."

8. Page 7, paragraph 11, lines 12-13: The meaning of the end of this sentence is not clear: ". . . Thailand . . . determinant."

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9. Page 9, lines 12 - 13 from bottom: Recommend deleting remainder of sentence after "concerned" as contrary to fact.
10. Page 10, paragraph 15, final sentence: Recommend deletion as envisaging a situation after July 1951 without war.
11. Page 10, paragraph 16: Recommend deletion, as unsound, of the second sentence of each of the first two sub-paragraphs.
12. Page 13, paragraph 23, lines 5 - 6: The Finns currently are not capable of resisting a Soviet invasion. Recommend deleting ". . . and, if . . . fight" and substituting therefor ". . . and would have to submit, if invaded by the Soviets."
13. Page 11: Recommend insertion of an additional paragraph between paragraphs 7 and 8 to reflect treatment of Yugoslavia in paragraph 12 on pages 7 and 8.

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